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    The age of oil is ending

    The age of oil is ending

    For more than a century, it has been cheaper than coffee and as constant as ocean waves.
    WILLIAM MARSDEN, The Gazette
    Published: Saturday, January 10

    Getting it is simple. You select the grade, insert the nozzle, squeeze the handle and gasoline comes out. A hundred years and the pump has never let us down. Gasoline is always available. There seems no end to it.

    Until now.

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    Oil derricks in Siberia: The world is fast running out of oil and some experts say the beginning of the end struck last summer when oil hit $147 a barrel.

    On top of the other problems plaguing the world such as global warming and the current financial meltdown, there’s a third pressing issue that threatens to bring the good life to an end. It’s the fact that the world is fast running out of oil.

    Given that crude oil makes up 36.4 per cent of the world’s energy consumption, the seriousness of shortages cannot be underplayed. Our reliance on oil is almost total. It fuels 100 per cent of air and sea transport and most of our land transport. Without oil there is no petrochemical industry. Agriculture, manufacturing, building materials, the clothes we wear, the food we eat and the medicines we take depend on oil.

    Some experts, like Normand Mousseau, a physics professor at Université de Montréal who has written a book on the end of oil, say the beginning of the end struck last summer.

    “This is why the prices jumped to $147 a barrel,” said Mousseau, author of At the End of Oil: All You Need to Know about the Energy Crisis. “As soon as the economy comes back, they will be right back up.”

    Others say the crunch will come in three to 10 years depending on our rate of consumption.

    “I hate being an alarmist about it, but our entire lifestyle is dependent on cheap oil and there just isn’t very much left in the ground,” Andrew Miall, professor of geology at the University of Toronto, said in an interview.

    Most petroleum geology experts contend that we have already discovered the world’s giant fields and what’s left over will not keep the age of oil alive much longer.

    “It’s safe to say we have pinpricked the Earth thoroughly enough that it is very unlikely we have missed any Middle Easts,” Miall said. “There may be another North Sea or two, but nothing that is going to really change the energy scene.”

    Matt Simmons, chairman and CEO of Simmons and Company International, which is a private energy investment banker based in Texas, said he believes the world’s oil reserves have already peaked and we are on the downward slide.

    “I think basically we are now in the early days of a very serious pending scarcity of oil and natural gas,” he said. “Because we don’t know we are, we are not putting any clamps on demand.”

    Simmons has been studying world oil production and reserves for decades. His company helps finance exploration and production.

    He predicted – accurately as it turned out – that the North Sea fields would peak between 1998 and 2000. Now he has turned his attention to Mexico, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, warning that their fields also have hit the downward slide.

    “All the major oil fields of the world have peaked and we are going to see soon some precipitous collapses,” he said.

    Because production flows still can keep pace with demand, the price has remained deceptively low, giving the erroneous impression there’s still lots of oil out there. Even at its record high of $147 a barrel, crude oil was still only 22 cents a cup, which is a fraction of the cost of a regular coffee at Tim Hortons.

    Simmons called the price of oil absurdly low: “Let’s say you and five fat friends run out of gas and you see a guy coming down the street riding a donkey and pulling an old messy cart and you say, ‘Hey pull over here. Can you take me and my five fat friends a couple of miles for 22 cents,’ which is what that much gas will get you. And the guy’s going to flip you the bird. ‘Are you stupid?’ ”

    Oil prices, Simmons said, have to skyrocket to have an impact on demand.

    “If demand doesn’t slow down, we will end up having shortages and we will basically run out of motor gasoline.”

    Our recent consumption rates are the most voracious in history. By the end of 2007, the world had consumed about 1.1 trillion barrels of oil. Half of this was consumed over the last 25 years alone. So far, we have consumed about 50 per cent of the total recoverable oil, according to the World Energy Council.

    Simmons’s pessimistic view is shared by oil companies like BP and Shell plus a number of international studies including the World Energy Council’s 2007 Survey of Energy Resources.

    It concluded “the world is rapidly approaching the end of the First Half of the Age of Oil.”

    It went on to state: “The evidence suggests that the peak of world discovery was in the 1960s, meaning that the corresponding peak of production for ‘conventional oil’ (oil from oil wells as opposed to synthetic oil from tar sands, shale or coal) is approaching. The world started using more than it found in 1981 and that gap has widened since.”

    The study warns: “Given the central position of oil in the modern economy, the onset of decline threatens to be a time of great economic and geopolitical tension.”

    The study suggests production will peak around 2011 when the age of oil will begin its inevitable decline.

    The International Energy Agency claims peak oil is about 15 years away.

    But as the IEA states in its 2007 report, “What matters, and matters greatly, is the vision of the long decline that comes into view on the other side of (the peak).”

    Chris Skrebowski, a London-based member of the Energy Institute in Britain and consultant editor of the Petroleum Review, which is considered the oil industry bible, said he believes world oil reserves will peak “no later than 2012.”

    In other words, as of this writing there are 1,095 days to peak.

    He paints a doomsday scenario of a world blithely unaware that in a few years its oil-based lifestyle will begin to end.

    What is meant by peak? “Peak oil is when delivery flows can’t meet the demand,” Skrebowski said. Demand will outstrip production primarily because of a lack of sufficient reserves. Once that happens, we are on an unbroken downward slide.

    For Skrebowski, signs of the approaching peak are clear. High oil prices as well as the enormous price fluctuations we’re seeing are ultimately the result of emerging bidding wars over oil by oil-deficit countries.

    So how much oil is left in the world and how long will it last? The math is simple.

    It is generally accepted by energy experts that world crude oil reserves number about 1.2 trillion barrels. The level of certainty in this number is fixed at about 90 per cent.

    Our annual consumption is about 30 billion barrels a year. So as long as we don’t increase consumption, those reserves will last about 39 more years.

    But how accurate are the reserve estimates?

    Most experts don’t believe the reserve figures published by the Gulf states, which control 62 per cent of world reserves. Experts note that despite years of production increases and no new significant discoveries, Iran, Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia have left their reserve estimates largely unchanged since the early 1980s. In some cases, they have even increased them without proof or independent auditing.

    Consequently, the experts believe that at least 25 per cent of world reserves are overstated.

    “A lot of these figures that come from the Third World countries and the Mideast you really can’t trust them at all because much of the hard data is rarely made public,” Miall said.

    What’s more, exploration drilling has not yielded any new major fields. New wells, which are small and increasingly difficult to find, yield only one barrel for every three we consume, which means that we are using three barrels to every new barrel we find.

    Conventional oil discoveries – the kind we find in wells at the end of a drill bit – take at least seven years to bring on stream. So even if major new fields were discovered, which experts say is a remote possibility, they could not be brought into production fast enough to meet rising demand.

    The most important discoveries have been in ultra-deep water, such as the recently discovered oil fields off the coast of Brazil. But cost estimates for extraction vary from $200 billion to $600 billion U.S. Whether it is even possible to extract it is questionable. Should drilling prove successful, it will take about a decade to bring on stream. Preliminary estimates indicate the wells contain 15 to 30 billion barrels of high quality oil. That will keep us going only for another year. These reserve estimates, however, are not based on solid evidence since no one has flow-tested these wells, Simmons said.

    The high Arctic is said to contain about 90 billion barrels. There is, however, no proof of this. Miall, who has surveyed the Arctic, said decades of drilling has yielded little more than moderate amounts of natural gas.

    Hope that unconventional oil, most of which is in Canada’s tar sands, will fill the void left by declining conventional stocks remains empty.

    Measuring future oil production is not just a question of reserves. It’s also a question of flow: how much oil can we produce and get to market in time to meet demand.

    Converting tar sands bitumen into synthetic crude oil and getting it to market in sizeable enough quantities to make up for losses in conventional oil production so far has proven too tough a challenge.

    Skrebowski notes that even though tar sand reserves are equal to the total reserves of non-OPEC countries, the tar sands constitute barely 2 per cent of the non-OPEC flow rate.

    “Non-OPEC reserves flow at nearly 50 million barrels a day,” he said. “Canadian tar sands after 30 years of reasonably heavy investment is 1.4 to 1.7 million. And that’s the problem. There is a huge volume of stuff within the Canadian tar sands. No one doubts it. But we have so far found it impossible to really flow that at any significant rate without totally destroying the environment, although you are doing quite a good job of that already.”

    Despite dwindling reserves, demand for oil is expected to continue to rise in China, India and other Asia countries. This will only hasten the moment of peak oil.

    In most of the oil producing countries, production has already peaked. New important discoveries are doubtful.

    Canada’s conventional oil production peaked in about 1995. U.S. production peaked in the 1970s. North Sea wells peaked in 2000. Mexico peaked in 1997 and Venezuelan production is peaking.

    In all, Skrebowski said, about 28 significant producers are in decline. This represents about 35 per cent of global production. Once that figure reaches 51 per cent, “we reach global peak oil,” he said.

    The only place where production continues to hold up is in the Persian Gulf.

    But the elephant wells of Saudi Arabia are showing signs of exhaustion and the Saudis are indicating that they want to begin preserving their oil for their children.

    The idea that the world will run out of oil in this century was first posited in the 1940s by U.S. geologist M. King Hubbert, who created a mathematical formula for calculating reserves versus demand. Initially, he was considered a nut as oil companies insisted that the world was awash in oil. His predictions, however, have come true and no longer do geologists and oil executives blithely dismiss the notion that the age of oil is drawing to a close. Yet politicians have not addressed the issue.

    “They are terrified of it,” Skrebowski said. “They don’t know what to do. There are no pat solutions. The way the world grabbed onto biofuels and then proved that it wasn’t a very good idea seems to be an attempt to find an easy way out of the box. If you think about it, since the Second World War, the politics of the western world has been about divvying up the sweeties. Now you have to get up on your hind legs and say, ‘Well, we have to start taking the sweeties away. Maybe you can have some sweeties later but you can’t have any sweeties now.’ That’s hardly a recipe for getting yourself elected.”

    Unless we address the issue now, he said, oil shortages will be ruinous for the economy.

    Skrebowski warns: “One of the reasons peak oil could really get out of hand is if a lot of the existing producers suddenly decide that the best return is leaving this oil in the ground, saving it for later generations. Then you could get a sudden dramatic shortfall in supply. It is a perfectly reasonable thing for any nation state to say, ‘Of course these are our resources. Surely we should be using them for the benefit of our people.’ ”

    Consider this: Eighty per cent of the world’s oil is controlled by governments through their national companies. Most of those countries are run by gangster democracies, oligarchies and highly unstable regimes. Should any one of these countries reduce flow, the impact on the world economies could be catastrophic. That’s how tight the situation is.

    Imagine Canada cutting off or reducing oil and gas exports to the U.S. The result would be catastrophic for not only the U.S. economy but the world economy and could lead to war.

    Skrebowski says: “One thought I would impart … is that this is a valuable and ultimately scarce resource and therefore there is always an obligation that whenever we use it, we use it as efficiently as possible for the maximum benefit. It’s almost a moral imperative, like not wasting food when food is scarce.”

    wmarsden@thegazette.canwest.com

    원문: http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/saturdayextra/story.html?id=153514b8-0a4f-47d8-a68f-24e779264fcd&k=33033&p=1

     

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    Robert Bosch’s start/stop technology to be featured on Fiat 500

    Robert Bosch’s start/stop technology to be featured on Fiat 500

    5th December 2008
    By Staff Writer

    In the Fiat 500, the system will initially be available in combination with the dualogic automated manual transmission and a 1.2-liter engine. Fiat plans to install the system in other variants and models as early as 2009.

    Bosch has adjusted the service life of the starter for a far greater number of starts. Its powerful electric starter motor as well as low-noise, enhanced meshing mechanics guarantee safe, fast, and quiet engine starts in all situations, according to Bosch.

    Bosch also supplies the engine control unit for the Fiat 500, including the software used to analyze all the relevant sensor data, and to stop and start the engine.

    In addition, the battery sensor is also supplied by Bosch. It computes the current state of battery charge and relays this information to the energy management system.

    Stefan Asenkerschbaumer, president of the starter motors and generators division at Robert Bosch, said: “In 2008, roughly 5% of all new vehicles in Europe are equipped with a start/stop system. By 2012, we estimate this will be every second newly registered vehicle most of them with Bosch technology.”

    Economic Slump May Limit Moves on Clean Energy

    Economic Slump May Limit Moves on Clean Energy

    By ELISABETH ROSENTHAL
    Published: November 24, 2008

    Just as the world seemed poised to combat global warming more aggressively, the economic slump and plunging prices of coal and oil are upending plans to wean businesses and consumers from fossil fuel.

    From Italy to China, the threat to jobs, profits and government tax revenues posed by the financial crisis has cast doubt on commitments to cap emissions or phase out polluting factories.

    Automakers, especially Detroit’s Big Three, face collapsing sales, threatening their plans to invest heavily in more fuel-efficient cars. And with gas prices now around $2 a gallon in the United States, struggling consumers may be less inclined than they once were to trade in their gas-guzzling models in any case.

    President-elect Barack Obama and the European Union have vowed to stick to commitments to cap emissions of carbon dioxide and invest in new green technologies, arguing that government action could stimulate the economy and create new jobs in producing sustainable energy.

    But as the United Nations prepares to gather the world’s environment ministers in Poznan, Poland, next week to try to agree on a new treaty to reduce emissions, both the political will and the economic underpinnings for a much more assertive strategy appear shakier than they did even a few weeks ago.

    “Yes things have changed,” said Yvo de Boer, executive secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, in a phone interview. He is organizing the meeting in Poland.

    “European industry is saying we can’t deal with financial crisis and reduce emissions at the same time,” he said. “Heads of government have other things on their minds.”

    The economic decline also could complicate the political calculus of limiting emissions in developing countries, especially China.

    China overtook the United States as the largest producer of greenhouse gases in 2007. But the surge in heavy industry there that produced a sharp increase in its emissions already has given signs of turning into a bust.

    Some experts argue that China’s emissions — and the pressing need to limit them — may recede until economic conditions improve.

    No government has officially repudiated climate goals; in Bali last year, all the nations of the world promised to pursue an emissions control treaty. Mr. de Boer said he remained optimistic that major powers would ultimately stick to pledges to reduce emissions.

    “I don’t think anyone will show the stupidity to focus on the short term and ignore the long-term issue because these decisions will be with us for 30 years,” he said.

    Even so, there are signs of considerable backpedaling in at least near-term commitments to invest in green technology and alternative energy.

    Italy’s environment minister, Stefania Prestagiacomo, said last month that “profound changes” were needed in the European Union climate package because of the global economic crisis. Coal-based economies like Poland’s have expressed similar worries.

    Theolia, one of France’s largest alternative energy companies, has canceled plans for a subsidiary devoted to emerging markets, and pulled back on its goals of how much energy it could produce by 2009.

    In the United States, T. Boone Pickens, the Oklahoma oil tycoon who leased hundreds of thousands of acres in West Texas for a giant wind farm, has now delayed the project. He told reporters at a recent news conference that fossil fuel prices would have to rise again before it was economically viable.

    Barbara Helfferich, the European Commission spokeswoman on the environment, said, “Investing in reducing emission is more difficult to do in times of economic downturn than when you have money to spend.”

    Mr. Obama, Mr. de Boer and Stavros Dimas, the European Union environment commissioner, all argue that by promoting new green jobs, even with heavy government subsidies, they could create an engine of economic growth that would help countries pull themselves out of the recession.

    Mr. Obama, without releasing specifics of his proposed economic stimulus package, called on the country to build “wind farms and solar panels, fuel-efficient cars and the alternative energy technologies that can free us from our dependence on foreign oil and keep our economy competitive in the years ahead.”

    The European Commission says it is planning to stay its course toward lower emissions — a 20-percent reduction by 2020 — and in so doing hopes to have a “first mover advantage” in terms of job creation, renewable sources and energy innovation once the global economy rebounds.

    “I know it sounds counterintuitive, but our argument is that because there is an economic turndown, it is just the time to tackle the transition from a high-carbon to a low-carbon economy,” Ms. Helfferich said.

    Recessions can be good or bad for achieving environmental goals, and it remains uncertain how this one will play out.

    In the short term, economic declines tend to reduce emissions, because industrial production slows down. Retrenchment will certainly curb fast-growing emissions from China, for example, where double-digit economic growth has been based partly on production from the most polluting industries, such as steel, cement and aluminum. But such reductions are inevitably temporary, rebounding when the economy picks up.

    Against this, the current economic slump could have serious long-term environmental consequences, because it may reduce investment in greener production technologies without fundamentally changing the longer-term emissions picture. With so many renewable energy projects and programs in their nascent stages, their success is easily undercut by lack of credit or financing.

    Centrica, a British company that has been building wind farms to meet its target of having 15 percent of that country’s energy come from renewable sources by 2020, has put three planned offshore wind farms on hold, in part because of rising credit costs. Without projects like these it is unclear if Britain’s ambitious emissions reductions target can be met.

    At the same time, the price of buying permits to emit carbon dioxide in Europe — a system the European Union uses to discourage companies from polluting — have fallen by half compared with the price a year ago, largely because of slower growth.

    Wind costs more than $2.5 billion per gigawatt to build, compared with $600 million for gas. Carbon permits and subsidies can narrow that gap, but the current low prices mean that it is cheaper to burn coal, even after paying penalties for the carbon dioxide emissions.

    The United Nations says that 40 percent of the world’s power generating capacity has to be replaced in the next 5 to 10 years. Six months ago, high oil prices, easy credit and political pressure led many governments to promote biofuels, wind farms and nuclear projects and phase out fossil fuel plants. But the logic of spending more on such plants has at least partly evaporated.

    “If because of the current economic scenario, you choose cheap and dirty, we’ll be in big trouble,” Mr. de Boer said.

    Paradoxically, it may not look that way, at least at first. One big short-term effect of the economic situation is likely to be a reduction of emissions from the developing world. In the decade after the Eastern bloc countries gained independence in 1989, pollution dropped precipitously, as Soviet-era heavy industry shut down.

    Emissions dropped sharply between 1990 and 2000, only to start rebounding in the boom years after 2000. By 2006, for example, emissions dropped by 1 percent in industrialized countries (mostly those in Western Europe) that report their emissions to the United Nations. At the same time, they increased by 3 percent in the so called “economies in transition,” including the former Soviet bloc states of Eastern Europe.

    In the current global recession China could follow a similar trajectory.

    The number of cement plants in China rose to 7,000 from 3,000 from the year 2002 to 2007, as China built new cities at a record pace. That catapulted China to top of the list of global emitters, more than a decade earlier than scientists had anticipated just a few years before.

    Yet straight-line projections about China’s emissions are now again in question, said Trevor Houser, a visiting fellow at the Washington-based Peterson Institute for International Economics.

    “Demand for goods like steel, cement and aluminum is contracting severely, so the energy used to produce them is also severely down,” he said.

    Last month, he said, China’s energy use fell by 4 percent compared with the same month in 2007. A year ago, use was growing at an annual rate of 15 percent.

    That may ultimately be a good thing for the Chinese economy as well as the environment, because heavy industry produces heavy emissions, but very few jobs.

    Indeed, the slowdown may provide an opportunity for China, too, to reinvent itself with investment in a greener economy. “Slower energy demand provides an opportunity to move away from coal,” he said.

    Still, such benefits may be more apparent to environmentalists than to factory owners and finance ministers trying to meet budgets and make profits. The European Union estimates that it will cost Italian industry 13 billion euros, about $16.7 billion, to reduce emissions. Italy puts the cost up to 27 billion euros, which is says it cannot afford.

    “Transitions are expensive, but this one will help avoid the ups and downs we’ve recently seen,” Ms. Helfferich said. “This is a short-term bitter apple to create new sectors that are conducive to fighting climate change and jobs as well.”

    기사원문 ::  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/25/world/25climate.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&hp

    Moore’s Curse and the Great Energy Delusion

    Moore’s Curse and the Great Energy Delusion

    By Vaclav Smil
    From the Magazine: Wednesday, November 19, 2008
    Filed under: Big Ideas

    Our transition away from fossil fuels will take decades—if it happens at all.

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    During the early 1970s we were told by the promoters of nuclear energy that by the year 2000 America’s coal-based electricity generation plants would be relics of the past and that all electricity would come from nuclear fission. What’s more, we were told that the first generation fission reactors would by then be on their way out, replaced by super-efficient breeder reactors that would produce more fuel than they were initially charged with.

    During the early 1980s some aficionados of small-scale, distributed, “soft” (today’s “green”) energies saw America of the first decade of the 21st century drawing 30 percent to 50 percent of its energy use from renewables (solar,wind, biofuels). For the past three decades we have been told how natural gas will become the most important source of modern energy: widely cited forecasts of the early 1980s had the world deriving half of its energy from natural gas by 2000. And a decade ago the promoters of fuel cell cars were telling us that such vehicles would by now be on the road in large numbers, well on their way to displacing ancient and inefficient internal combustion engines.

    These are the realities of 2008: coal-fired power plants produce half of all U.S. electricity, nuclear stations 20 percent, and there is not a single commercial breeder reactor operating anywhere in the world; in 2007 the United States derives about 1.7 percent of its energy from new renewable conversions (corn-based ethanol, wind, photovoltaic solar, geothermal); natural gas supplies about 24 percent of the world’s commercial energy—less than half the share predicted in the early 1980s and still less than coal with nearly 29 percent; and there are no fuel-cell cars.

    This list of contrasts could be greatly extended, but the point is made: all of these forecasts and anticipations failed miserably because their authors and promoters ignored one of the most important realities ruling the behavior of complex energy systems—the inherently slow pace of energy transitions.

    “Energy transitions” encompass the time that elapses between an introduction of a new primary energy source oil, nuclear electricity, wind captured by large turbines) and its rise to claiming a substantial share (20 percent to 30 percent) of the overall market, or even to becoming the single largest contributor or an absolute leader (with more than 50 percent) in national or global energy supply. The term also refers to gradual diffusion of new prime movers, devices that replaced animal and human muscles by converting primary energies into mechanical power that is used to rotate massive turbogenerators producing electricity or to propel fleets of vehicles, ships, and airplanes. There is one thing all energy transitions have in common: they are prolonged affairs that take decades to accomplish, and the greater the scale of prevailing uses and conversions the longer the substitutions will take. The second part of this statement seems to be a truism but it is ignored as often as the first part: otherwise we would not have all those unrealized predicted milestones for new energy sources.

    Preindustrial societies had rather simple and fairly stationary patterns of primary energy use. They relied overwhelmingly on biomass fuels (wood, charcoal, straw) for heat and they supplemented their dominant prime movers(muscles) with wind to sail ships and in some regions with windmills and small waterwheels. This traditional arrangement prevailed in Europe and the Americas until the beginning of the 19th century, and it dominated most of Asia and Africa until the middle of the 20th century. The year 1882 was likely the tipping point of the transition to fossil fuels, the time when the United States first burned more coal than wood. The best available historical reconstructions indicate that it was only sometime during the late 1890s that the energy content of global fossil fuel consumption, nearly all of it coal, came to equal the energy content of wood, charcoal, and crop residues.

    The Western world then rapidly increased its reliance on fossil fuels and hydroelectricity, but in large parts of Africa and Asia the grand energy transition from traditional biomass fuels to fossil fuels has yet to be completed. Looking only at modern primary energies on a global scale, coal receded from about 95 percent of the total energy supply in 1900 to about 60 percent by 1950 and less than 24 percent by 2000. But coal’s importance continued to rise in absolute terms, and in 2001 it even began to regain some of its relative importance. As a result, coal is now relatively more important in 2008 (nearly 29 percent of primary energy) than it was at the time of the first energy “crisis” in 1973 (about 27 percent). And in absolute terms it now supplies twice as much energy as it did in 1973: the world has been returning to coal rather than leaving it behind.

    Although oil became the largest contributor to the world’s commercial energy supply in 1965 and its share reached 48 percent by 1973, its relative importance then began to decline and in 2008 it will claim less than 37 percent of the total. Moreover, worldwide coal extraction during the 20th century contained more energy than any other fuel, edging out oil by about 5 percent. The common perception that the 19th century was dominated by coal and the 20th century by oil is wrong: in global terms, the 19th century was still a part of the millennia-long wooden era and 20th century was, albeit by a small margin, the coal century. And while many African and Asian countries use no coal, the fuel remains indispensable: it generates 40 percent of the world’s electricity, nearly 80 percent of all energy in South Africa (that continent’s most industrialized nation), 70 percent of China’s, and about 50 percent of India’s.

    The pace of the global transition from coal to oil can be judged from the following spans: it took oil about 50 years since the beginning of its commercial production during the 1860s to capture 10 percent of the global primary energy market, and then almost exactly 30 years to go from 10 percent to about 25 percent of the total. Analogical spans for natural gas are almost identical: approximately 50 years and 40 years. Regarding electricity, hydrogeneration began in 1882, the same year as Edison’s coal-fired generation, and just before World War I water power produced about 50 percent of the world’s electricity; subsequent expansion of absolute production could not prevent a large decline in water’s relative contribution to about 17 percent in 2008. Nuclear fission reached 10 percent of global electricity generation 27 years after the commissioning of the first nuclear power plant in 1956, and its share is now roughly the same as that of hydropower.

    These spans should be kept in mind when appraising potential rates of market penetration by nonconventional fossilfuels or by renewable energies. No less important is the fact that none of these alternatives has yet reached even 5 percent of its respective global market. Nonconventional oil, mainly from Alberta oil sands and from Venezuelan tar deposits, now supplies only about 3 percent of the world’s crude oil and only about 1 percent of all primary energy. Renewable conversions—mainly liquid biofuels from Brazil, the United States, and Europe, and wind-powered electricity generation in Europe and North America, with much smaller contributions from geothermal and photovoltaic solar electricity generation—now provide about 0.5 percent of the world’s primary commercial energy, and in 2007 wind generated merely 1 percent of all electricity.

    The absolute quantities needed to capture a significant share of the market, say 25 percent, are huge because the scale of the coming global energy transition is of an unprecedented magnitude. By the late 1890s, when combustion of coal (and some oil) surpassed the burning of wood, charcoal, and straw, these resources supplied annually an equivalent of about half a billion tons of oil. Today, replacing only half of worldwide annual fossil fuel use with renewable energies would require the equivalent of about 4.5 billion tons of oil. That’s a task equal to creating de novo an energy industry with an output surpassing that of the entire world oil industry—an industry that has taken more than a century to build.

    The scale of transition needed for electricity generation is perhaps best illustrated by deconstructing Al Gore’s July 2008 proposal to “re-power” America: “Today I challenge our nation to commit to producing 100 percent of our electricity from renewable energy and truly clean carbon-free sources within 10 years. This goal is achievable, affordable, and transformative.”

    Let’s see. In 2007 the country had about 870 gigawatts (GW) of electricity-generating capacity in fossil-fueled and nuclear stations, the two nonrenewable forms of generation that Gore wants to replace in their entirety. On average,these thermal power stations are at work about 50 percent of the time and hence they generated about 3.8 PWh (that is, 3.8 x 1015 watt-hours) of electricity in 2007. In contrast, wind turbines work on average only about 23 percent of the time, which means that even with all the requisite new high-voltage interconnections, slightly more than two units of wind-generating capacity would be needed to replace a unit in coal, gas, oil, and nuclear plants. And even if such an enormous capacity addition—in excess of 1,000 GW—could be accomplished in a single decade (since the year 2000, actual additions in all plants have averaged less than 30 GW/year!), the financial cost would be enormous: it would mean writing off the entire fossil-fuel and nuclear generation industry, an enterprise whose power plants alone have a replacement value of at least $1.5 trillion (assuming at least $1,700/installed kW), and spending at least $2.5 trillion to build the new capacity.

    But because those new plants would have to be in areas that are not currently linked with high-voltage (HV)transmission lines to major consumption centers (wind from the Great Plains to the East and West coasts,photovoltaic solar from the Southwest to the rest of the country), that proposal would also require a rewiring of the country. Limited transmission capacity to move electricity eastward and westward from what is to be the new power center in the Southwest, Texas, and the Midwest is already delaying new wind projects even as wind generates less than 1 percent of all electricity. The United States has about 165,000 miles of HV lines, and at least 40,000 additional miles of new high-capacity lines would be needed to rewire the nation, at a cost of close to $100 billion. And the costs are bound to escalate, because the regulatory approval process required before beginning a new line construction can take many years. To think that the United States can install in 10 years wind and solar generating capacity equivalent to that of thermal power plants that took nearly 60 years to construct is delusional.

    And energy transitions from established prime movers to new converters also take place across time spans measured in decades, not in a decade. Steam engines, whose large-scale commercial diffusion began with James Watt’s improved design introduced during the 1770s, remained important into the middle of the 20th century. There is no more convincing example of their endurance than the case of Liberty ships, the “ships that won the war” as they carried American materiel and troops to Europe and Asia between 1942 and 1945. Rudolf Diesel began to develop his highly efficient internal combustion engine in 1892 and his prototype engine was ready by 1897. The first small ship engines were installed on river-going vessels in 1903, and the first oceangoing ship with Diesel engines was launched in 1911. By 1939 a quarter of the world’s merchant fleet was propelled by these engines and virtually every new freighter had them. But nearly 3,000 Liberty ships were still powered by oil-fired steam engines. And steam locomotives disappeared from American railroads only by the late 1950s, while in China and India they were indispensable even during the 1980s.

    Automobilization offers similar examples of gradual diffusion, and the adoption of automotive diesel engines is another excellent proof of slow transition. The gasoline-fueled internal combustion engine—the most important transportation prime mover of the modern world—was first deployed by Benz, Maybach, and Daimler during the mid-1880s, and it reached a remarkable maturity in a single generation after its introduction (Ford’s Model T in 1908).

    But massive automobilization swept the United States only during the 1920s and Europe and Japan only during the 1960s, a process amounting to spans of at least 30 to 40 years in the U.S. case and 70 to 80 years in the European case between the initial introduction and decisive market conquest (with more than half of all families having a car). The first diesel-powered car (Mercedes-Benz 260D) was made in 1936, but it was only during the 1990s that diesels began to claim more than 15 percent of the new car market in major EU countries, and only during this decade that they began to account for more than a third of all newly sold cars. Once again, roughly half a century had to elapse between the initial introduction and significant market penetration.

    And despite the fact that diesels have been always inherently more efficient than gasoline-fueled engines (the difference is up to 35 percent) and that modern diesel-powered cars have very low particulate and sulphur emissions, their share of the U.S. car market remains negligible: in 2007 only 3 percent of newly sold cars were diesels.

    And it has taken more than half a century for both gasoline- and diesel-fueled internal combustion engines to displace agricultural draft animals in industrialized countries: the U.S. Department of Agriculture stopped counting draft animals only in 1963, and the process is yet to be completed in many low-income nations.

    Finally, when asked to name the world’s most important continuously working prime mover, most people would not name the steam turbine. The machine was invented by Charles Parsons in 1884 and it remains fundamentally unchanged 125 years later. Gradual advances in metallurgy made it simply larger and more efficient and these machines now generate more than 70 percent of the world’s electricity in fossil-fueled and nuclear stations (the rest comes from gas and water turbines as well as diesels).

    There is no common underlying process to explain the gradual nature of energy transitions. In the case of primary energy supply, the time span needed for significant market penetration is mostly the function of financing, developing, and perfecting necessarily massive and expensive infrastructures. For example, the world oil industry annually handles more than 30 billion barrels, or four billion tons, of liquids and gases; it extracts the fuel in more than 100 countries and its facilities range from self-propelled geophysical exploration rigs to sprawling refineries, and include about 3,000 large tankers and more than 300,000 miles of pipelines. Even if an immediate alternative were available, writing off this colossal infrastructure that took more than a century to build would amount to discarding an investment worth well over $5 trillion—but it is quite obvious that its energy output could not be replicated by any alternative in a decade or two.

    In the case of prime movers, the inertial nature of energy transitions is often due to the reliance on a machine that may be less efficient, such as a steam engine or gasoline-fueled engine, but whose marketing and servicing are well established and whose performance quirks and weaknesses are well known, as opposed to a superior converter that may bring unexpected problems and setbacks. Predictability may, for a long time, outweigh a potentially superior performance, and associated complications (for example, high particulate emissions of early diesels) and new supply-chain requirements (be it sufficient refinery capacity to produce low-sulfur diesel fuel or the availability of filling stations dispensing alternative liquids) may slow down the diffusion of new converters.

    All of these are matters of fundamental importance given the energy challenges facing the United States and the world. New promises of rapid shifts in energy sources and new anticipations of early massive gains from the deployment of new conversion techniques create expectations that will not be met and distract us from pursuing real solutions. Unfortunately, there is no shortage of these unrealistic calls, such as the popular claim that America should seek to generate 30 percent of its electricity supply from wind power by 2030.

    And now Al Gore is telling us that the United States can completely repower its electricity generation in a single decade! Gore has succumbed to what I call “Moore’s curse.” Moore’s Law describes a long-standing trend in computer processing power, observed by Intel cofounder Gordon Moore, whereby a computer’s power doubles every year and a half. This led Gore to claim that since “the price paid for the same performance came down by 50 percent every 18 months, year after year,” something similar can happen with energy systems.

    But the doubling of microprocessor performance every 18 months is an atypically rapid case of technical innovation. It does not represent—as the above examples of prime mover diffusion make clear—the norm of technical advances as far as new energy sources and new prime movers are concerned, and it completely ignores the massive infrastructural needs of new modes of electricity generation.

    The historical verdict is unassailable: because of the requisite technical and infrastructural imperatives and because of numerous (and often entirely unforeseen) socio-economic adjustments, energy transitions in large economies and on a global scale are inherently protracted affairs. That is why, barring some extraordinary commitments and actions, none of the promises for greatly accelerated energy transitions will be realized, and during the next decade none of the new energy sources and prime movers will make a major difference by capturing 20 percent to 25 percent of its respective market. A world without fossil fuel combustion is highly desirable and, to be optimistic, our collective determination, commitment, and persistence could accelerate its arrival—but getting there will demand not only high cost but also considerable patience: coming energy transitions will unfold across decades, not years.

    Vaclav Smil is the author of Energy at the Crossroads and Energy in Nature and Society (MIT Press). He is Distinguished Professor at the University of Manitoba.

    Image by Frans Lemmens/Bergman Group.

    기사원문 ::
    http://www.american.com/archive/2008/november-december-magazine/moore2019s-curse-and-the-great-energy-delusion

     

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    Peak Oil could trigger meltdown of society

    Peak Oil could trigger meltdown of society

    According to a newly published global oil supply report to be presented by the Energy Watch Group at the Foreign Press Association in London, world oil production peaked in 2006. Production will start to decline at a rate of several percent per year. By 2020, and even more by 2030, global oil supply will be dramatically lower. This will create a supply gap which can hardly be closed by growing contributions from other fossil, nuclear or alternative energy sources in this time frame.

    “The most alarming finding is the steep decline of the oil supply after peak”, warns J?g Schindler from the Energy Watch Group. This result, together with the timing of the peak, is obviously in sharp contrast to the projections by the International Energy Agency (IEA). “Since crude oil is the most important energy carrier at a global scale and since all kinds of transport rely heavily on oil, the future oil availability is of paramount importance as it entails completely different actions by politics, business and individuals.”, says Schindler.

    This cautious energy outlook corresponds with statements made by former US Defense Secretary and CIA Director, James Schlesinger, who said at a recent oil summit in Cork: “The battle is over, the oil peakists have won. Current US energy policy and the administration’s oil strategy in Iraq and Iran are deluded.”

    However, until recently the International Energy Agency denied that a fundamental change of energy supply is likely to happen in the near or medium term future. Hans-Josef Fell MP, a prominent member of the German Parliament, is clear: “The message by the IEA, namely that business as usual will also be possible in future, sends a diffusing signal to the markets and blocks investments in already available renewable energy technologies.

    Remaining world oil reserves are estimated to be 1,255 Gb (Giga barrel) according to the industry database HIS (2006). For the Energy Watch Group (EWG), however, there are sound reasons to modify these figures for some regions and key countries, leading to a corresponding EWG estimate of 854 Gb. This oil supply outlook does not rely primarily on

    Press release reserve data which in the past have frequently turned out to be unreliable. Hence the EWG analysis is based primarily on production data which can be observed more easily and which are more reliable.

    Peak oil is now. “The oil boom is over and will not return. All of us must get used to a different lifestyle.”, said King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, the largest global oil producer. For quite some time, a hot debate has been going on regarding peak oil. Institutions close to the energy industry, like CERA, are engaging in a campaign trying to debunk peak oil as a “theory”. However, the EWG report shows that peak oil is real. The world is at the beginning of a structural change of its economic system. This change will be triggered by a sharp decline of fossil fuel supplies and will influence almost all aspects of daily life. Climate change will also force mankind to change energy consumption patterns by significantly reducing the burning of fossil fuels.

    Anticipated supply shortages could easily lead to disturbing scenes of mass unrest as witnessed in Burma this month. For government, industry and the wider public just muddling through is not an option anymore as this situation could spin out of control and turn into a meltdown of society.

    “My experience of debating the peak oil issue with the oil industry, and trying to alert Whitehall to it, is that there is a culture of institutionalised denial in government and the energy industry. As the evidence of an early peak in production unfolds, this becomes increasingly impossible to understand”, says Jeremy Leggett, the Solarcentury CEO and former member of the British Government Renewables Advisory Board.