Techtrend

Study Warns ‘Peak Coal’ Could Be Just Years Away

a new study calls into question whether coal will still be cheapest available source of energy by the time electric vehicles start making a major dent in the auto market. Could a looming shortage force our hand in replacing coal with nuclear energy and renewables?

In recent years, peak oil theory has received a lot of attention—and not just from the commodities gurus and conspiracy theorists who have been shouting warnings from the rooftops for decades. With global energy demand rising and countries like China and India on the cusp providing the world with billions of new consumers seeking something similar to the energy-thirsty “American way of life,” even the mainstream media has been known to throw the term out there from time to time. In fact, it’s possible that the consensus on peak oil has shifted in the last decade from a question of “if,” to one of “when.”

What hasn’t gotten as much attention in recent years though is the global supply of another fossil fuel that mankind relies upon to power its prosperity: Coal. About half of the electricity used in the United States comes from the burning of coal, and in other countries that number is often much higher. China relies on the fuel for more than 70 percent of its energy. But with international demand for coal expected to rise by nearly 50 percent by 2030, exactly how much of this finite resource is left to mine, and how long will it be until global production peaks?

According to a study by Tadeusz Patzek of the University of Texas and Gregory Croft of Berkeley, that day is a lot closer than anyone would imagine. Patzek and Croft are warning that after 2011, global production rates for coal will begin to decline—sinking to 1990 levels by 2037 and dropping to half of peak production by 2037. The paper also projects a corresponding decrease in emissions from coal, by an average of 2 percent per year.

Peak coal isn’t a new concept by any stretch, in fact it dates back to M. King Hubbert, the founder of peak oil theory. Using the same model he correctly used to forecast the decline of American oil production back in 1956, Hubbert predicted that global coal production would reach its apex in 2150. Since then, other researchers have placed the event closer and closer to the present day, with a 2007 study by the Energy Watch Group claiming that China will only be able to sustain its production trajectory until 2015.

Original article:
http://peakoil.com/geology/study-warns-peak-coal-could-be-just-years-away/

Buildings consume more than 50 percent of our nation’s energy, about 40 percent to operate and 10 percent to build, maintain, and eventually dismantle (the latter is often overlooked and is not shown on the following chart). They are major consumers of energy, even more than transportation. In addition they have a long life – 50 to 100 years or longer. Homes use a little more than half of the total energy used for all buildings, or 22 percent of total U.S. energy. There are more than 115 million households in the U.S. and new housing construction typically runs between 1 and 2 million residences yearly.

Since the late 1990s, there have been three standards for energy performance beyond the basic building code requirements set by the International Energy Conservation Code (IECC); these are EnergyStar, LEED, and Building America. The first two standards have set energy goal savings in the 15-25 percent range. Building America has a higher range (30-60 percent), but has built relatively few homes. Two other new standards have recently been defined, one by the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) called the ICC-700-2008 National Green Building Standard, and the other from Germany, called Passivhaus (referred to as Passive House in this country).

The German Passive House standard sets a much higher energy savings goal than the other four. Passive Houses use ultra-thick insulation and highly efficient doors and windows, with an airtight building envelope to avoid heat loss through leaks. A Passive House uses so much less energy than a home built to conventional standards that little or no “active” central heating and/or cooling system is needed.

Because of global climate change, we need to dramatically reduce CO2 emissions by 80-90 percent before 2050. The building industry in the U.S. is now beginning to be aware of the seriousness of the CO2 problem and the need for deep energy cuts in buildings. However, the Green Building movement has so far had minimal effect on reducing building’s energy consumption. While some tens of thousands of so called “green” or energy-efficient buildings are now being constructed each year, this is a small number when compared to the conventional new homes being built. After ten years EnergyStar has certified only about 1 million of the more than 100 million existing homes.
Solution: Legislate 90% Energy Efficency in the Nation’s Building Codes

LEED certification program for commercial buildings has made only marginal progress and its parent organization, the US Green Building Council, has acknowledged that its position on energy consumption has not been a strong one. A new much higher performance standard is needed. National building codes for energy performance need to be legislated by the state and federal governments. These codes should meet the standards of 80% to 90% heating and cooling energy reductions of the German Passive House, the feasibility of which has been demonstrated in over 20,000 buildings in northern Europe over the last decade. A high standard will encourage innovation from builders and manufactures, as has been shown in Europe, which now has many super efficient products which are not available in the U.S. – yet.
Solutions: Retrofit the Millions of Existing Homes

Since homes last so long, it is important to deal with energy consumption in existing homes, not just in new homes. This is particularly true at a time when, due to the nation’s financial crisis, new building starts are at a very low point. For these reasons our main focus is on retrofitting the existing housing stock.

Home retrofitting should focus on making those changes with the greatest energy savings and least cost, such as finding and fixing air leaks, providing window coverings and/or replacements, eliminating phantom electrical loads, and installing ultra-low-energy appliances. Changes should be based upon an assessment of the individual house through the use of tools like blower door tests and infrared cameras. Part of the process of reducing energy use in buildings also includes increasing insulation in the building envelope (walls, ceilings and floor) and air-sealing the building. Only after heating loads have been reduced, ideally by 70 to 80 percent, will it then be time to consider replacing or eliminating the heating system and adding alternative energy sources.

Reducing energy use will conserve scarce resources, an important priority in the post-Peak Oil world, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Address to the Commission’s 2010 Consultation on Energy

by Luis de Sousa
Sat Jul 3rd, 2010 at 01:52:22 PM EST

Below the fold can be found the submission I produced for the Commission’s Consultation on Energy. Time has been in short supply lately, what was initially conceived as a draft to be posted for public review and completion ended up successively postponed to the last few days. This version was sent to the Consultation’s e-mail box last night at 23H53 CET, only 7 minutes before the deadline. References are scant, some sections are incomplete and the English shaky here and there; but it contains some food for though, especially in the opening stages. [UPDATE 05-07-2010] A bunch of typos identified by melo corrected.

Below the fold can be found the submission I produced for the Commission’s Consultation on Energy. Time has been in short supply lately, what was initially conceived as a draft to be posted for public review and completion ended up successively postponed to the last few days. This version was sent to the Consultation’s e-mail box last night at 23H53 CET, only 7 minutes before the deadline. References are scant, some sections are incomplete and the English shaky here and there; but it contains some food for though, especially in the opening stages. [UPDATE 05-07-2010] A bunch of typos identified by melo corrected.

Address to the Commission’s 2010 Consultation on Energy
Luís Moreira de Sousa
luis.a.de.sousa@gmail.com
July 3, 2010

1 Introduction

This document is an attempt to address the Energy Consultation launched by the European Commission in the first half of 2010. This consultation is part of a process that shall take the Commission to a new Energy Policy Programme a few years from now.

After 6 years with energy prices much above the ground flat figures that made the norm during the previous two decades, the European Union is finally taking into due consideration this crucial sector. It is now contemplating an Economy highly dependent on foreign energy, together with meagre and dwindling traditional sources of indigenous energy. As it stands now, the Socio-Economic model the European Union is built on simply doesn’t seem able to perdure on traditional sources of energy, especially fossil fuels. This has lead to the Programme know as 20-20-20, that among other things, aims at increasing energy production from renewable energy sources and efficiency. This Programme is rather shy in many areas and in others it contradicts itself or is contradicted by other Communitarian policies.

It is more that time for a new, serious and all-encompassing Energy Policy for Europe. Otherwise the survival of Europe itself is at stake; and not only the European Construction project, but states themselves may disintegrate if they are not willing or capable of tackling the transition due ahead. Simply put, there’s no Economy without accessible and secure Energy, and without an Economy there’s no Social State.

This document is divided into two sections, one outlining the Background, where Europe is squared in today’s world energy market, and a second presenting a possible Policy, congruent with the given panorama, establishing goals and pointing possible means.

Some deeper issues that are either closely related to, or at the root of, today’s energy problems are not address in this document; two obvious cases are Population and the Monetary System. Essentially, the Policy presented assumes implicitly that Economic Growth is viable in the future. The aim of this document is to present practical options that can be easily grasped by lawmakers and stakeholders in general, leaving outside more complex concerns, that though important, should be discussed in a different context.
2 Background

This section tries to explain why energy come back to be a public concern in recent years and why stakeholders have been dedicated to it more than usual. Each fossil fuel is briefly analysed separately, with a few observations on the expected evolution of its availability. Finally, some reflections are made on the consequences to Europe’s Economy.
2.1 Oil

Oil prices began in 2004 a cavalcade that would last for almost 4 years, slowly breaking all previous records. Even in the wake of the hardest Economic recession of the last 30 years, oil prices are today about four times what they where a decade ago. These incessant high prices have lent the due credibility to those that for some time had warned against impeding difficulties in continuing the breathless world Oil production growth of the past two decades. Among these can be highlighted Colin Campbell and Jean Laherrére [1], Richard Duncan and Walter Youngquist [2] or Kenneth Deffeyes [3] for their oil production forecasts or Ali Bakhtiari [4] for his price predictions.

The constraints to oil production growth have today been acknowledge by most, even by the Industry itself [5], as show by Figure 1. Also notable have been the implicit warnings issued by the IEA, that despite continuously publishing production scenarios perpetually matching demand, have been vocal in other contexts explaining how unlikely that is to happen, especially in the figure of it’s Chief-Economist, Fatih Birol [6].

Peak Oil, as was baptised by Colin Campbell, is a pretty palpable reality at this stage, but for Europe reality is bit more intricate. Only one of its states is a net oil exporter, with most meeting their needs fully with imports. Figure 2 presents the volumes of oil made available at the international market every year by all the relevant exporters and a forecast of its evolution into the future. International oil trade peaked in 2005 and has entered a permanent decline; moreover, this decline will likely accelerate during the next decade, by 2020 taking away between 1/3 or 1/4 of the volume of oil available in the market in 2005. This has been the main reason behind the high price environment of the past 6 years.

But Europe’s woes deepen further, its most important suppliers, Norway and Russia, that supply Europe almost exclusively, are themselves entering terminal production decline. Within a decade Norway’s oil exports shall be no more that a small fraction of what they are today; as for Russia an halving of exports in the same period must be seen as likely.

It is hard to envision how Europe will square in this race for the dwindling international oil market. One thing is for certain, with its heavy foreign dependence and now diminutive internal production it is the Economic block with most to lose.
2.2 Gas

A Peak of world Natural Gas production is not something to expect in the short term. Though some have pointed to such possibility, even independent researchers usually position it some decades away. Today, with the development of unconventional reserves in North America, terminal decline in that region at least has been postponed for some years.

But Gas is not a fungible commodity like Oil, its trade is mostly regional, reliant on pipeline deliveries. Europe’s access to this energy source must be observed at a geographically restricted scope. Imports equate to about 60% of consumption, supplied by three neighbouring blocks: Russia, Norway and the Magreb. Norway is reaching its production zenith by now, with a visible reduction in exports unfolding in the next decade. Russia is still away from such decline, likely maintaining present production levels during the next fifteen to twenty years; the question on Russia is its internal demand, which has been slowly eating away export capacity. A maintenance of present Russian gas exports to Europe can be seen as a best case scenario. The only export capacity growth to expect is from the Magreb, though not in sufficient volumes to make the gap opened by the other two neighbouring suppliers.

Compounding on this imports scenario is a declining internal production. Peaking in 2001 during the golden days of the North Sea, gas production in Europe has been slowly declining up to now and should accelerate into the future. A huge gap will open between production and a relentless demand that up to 2008 had been growing 2% annually. Euan Mearns [8] produced an analysis of the European Gas Market in 2007 that detailed these issues, a digest is presented in Figure 3. The only way to match an annual demand growth of 2% would be importing all the Natural Gas traded in the world by ship in liquid state. The likelihood of that is very slim, especially in face of competition from emerging economies.

In Europe, but especially in the United States, Natural Gas has been used as a campaigning flag by some politicians, promoting it as a benign or beneficial energy source, in some cases even casting the idea of a non-fossil origin [9]. This has created the wrong impression that Gas may be the answer to most, if not all, of the world’s energy problems. The United Kingdom, for instance, is expecting to be generating two thirds of its electricity from Natural Gas a few years from now; how that will be possible is beyond anyone.
2.3 Coal

Like Gas, a peak of world Coal production is not to be expected in the short term. And unlike the two previous fossil fuels, reserves and future production profiles estimates are yet to converge. Predictions exist for a world Coal Peak between 2025 and 2060, remaining open the question of whether it can ever surpass today’s energy flow from Oil.

In the short term Coal presents different challenges, stemming from the relatively small size of its international market; most of the Coal mined in the world is consumed within borders. Coal consumption in the EU has decreased dramatically in the wake of the economic crisis (down 17% since 2008) but it still is the main source of baseload electricity in most states, with 45% of it being imported. On the other side of the table are the emerging economies, India alone should in 2010 consume more Coal than the EU for the first time in History; as for China, it consumes almost half of all the Coal mined in the world, almost six times what the EU consumes and growing close to 10% per annum.

So far China remained Coal self-sufficient, despite some sporadic periods when it had to temporarily recur to the international market. One of these episodes took place in the Spring of 2007, at a time when prices in Europe where around 45 $/tonne. China became a net importer of Coal for a few months and even after closing the gap later that year, faced a harsh Winter in the early weeks of 2008, that compromised mining and transport, prompting shortages in most of the country. By this time Coal was being traded at the Amsterdam port for more than 140 $/tonne [10]. It took less than 12 months for Coal prices to produce the same move Oil prices made in four years.

Coal Consumption in Asia is growing so fast that episodes like the 2007/2008 crunch can become permanent. The IEA expects China and India together to be demanding over 110 Mtoe on the international market already by 2015 [6]; this figure is very close to what the EU imported together in 2009. Can the international market cope with such demand surge? Of all international fossil fuel markets, Coal may well be the one yielding the greatest surprises for the next decade.
2.4 Fossil Fuels and the Economy

High energy prices had been the omens of Economic Recession during the XX century, once it became clear in 2004 that OPEC was impotent to rein in oil prices, many where those announcing an imminent crisis. The shock came only in 2008, when high energy prices coupled with rising interest rates dried up household spending and triggered credit defaults throughout much of the OECD. This crisis revealed serious fragilities in the financial system with over indebtedness by households, companies and states.

In Europe this recession had different impacts on different states, but immediately threatened liquidity all across the bloc. This was dealt at the time with state guarantees on private bank credit, but with economic activity nearly stalled, it evolved into a confidence crisis on state solvability. This confidence crisis affected only some states, particularly those in the Eurogroup with large budget deficits, though they are indebted mostly to other EU states. But it is paramount to note that those states that are today in bigger trouble to finance themselves are exactly those more reliant on Oil as primary energy source [11], as Figure 4 shows.

There may be several reasons for this coincidence, but it clearly shows that fossil fuel dependence is having a determining role in the present crisis. Moreover, it also indicates that a Pan-European scope is indispensable for an effective Energy Policy.

The Economic Crisis is now going on for almost 2 years. GDP numbers may have grown occasionally, but Unemployment figures are still high and in some cases still growing. At the same time oil prices remain about 2.5 times what they where back in 2004. An Economy based on fossil fuels will always have little roam to grow while supplies of these energy sources remai

Arrogance and Scientific Rules of Thumb

One of my favorite sources of rules of thumb is thermodynamics. It doesn’t tell you how to do things, or how fast you can do them, but it tells you whether something, like running your car on water, is impossible.

Most people know that there are three laws of thermodynamics: energy can neither be created nor destroyed; you can’t break even except at absolute zero, but you can’t reach absolute zero. Adding some chemical specifics gives very useful rules of thumb. Engineers have other rules of thumb, from thermodynamics and practical experience.

I’ll give a few examples of those rules. They become so engrained if you do science or engineering for a while that you don’t think of them–they become a sort of common sense, different from everyday common sense. So when someone says something that contravenes them, a scientist is likely to reply sharply that that’s wrong.

Rule #1 (no significance to the numbers): If it’s an obvious idea, chances are that someone’s thought of it before, and there’s a good reason why it won’t work. This is not a reason to give up, but rather a guide to checking the idea out.

This rule doesn’t flow directly from thermodynamics. It’s more in the realm of how science works. One of the most basic things that a scientist learns is that his/her own mind is the first place that mistakes will be made. It’s too easy to bend facts in your mind toward what you want, to determine a conclusion and then figure out how it has to be done. So when a scientist has a great idea, the first reaction is to ask whether it fits with the rules of thumb and whether it’s been done before. If it goes against any of these, a scientist’s reaction is, “What did I get wrong?” not “That’s the way it ought to be.”

I had a boss once – a physicist in a project that was mostly chemistry – who believed that creativity depended on not knowing too much about a subject. This is a view taken by many physicists and too many of those proffering solutions to the Deepwater Horizon blowout. My boss would come around with a great idea; we would tell him what was wrong with it; and then he’d let it go. It wasted time, which is why I prefer some base of subject knowledge as a takeoff point for creativity, but he put the process of science into play and lived by it: peer review. There are a lot of ways to check out a new idea: ask other people; repeat the experiment; check the literature. You can’t get creative if you stick with a loser idea. The important thing is to give it up once someone shows you it’s foolish.

BP’s blowout at Deepwater Horizon is particularly difficult to comprehend because of its scale. Most of us are not accustomed to thinking of the pressures under a mile of water, nor gases flashing out of the liquid as the petroleum bursts from the pipe, the enormous pressure behind it, the five-story blowout preventer. The construction of the well is not easily visualized, particularly if you’ve never learned how a well is constructed, now with an unknown degree of damage. I’ve dealt with drillers, had the business of mud described to me, and I can’t describe it now in any detail myself.

So extrapolations from experience in watering the garden are unlikely to provide solutions. Heck, if you think that the well can just be buried, plant a hose in the ground shooting full force upward and try to cover it with dirt. Nor are computer games or action movies a good guide to what can be done.

Rule #2: Input for a product should be water and air; other things cost more. KISS: Keep it simple, stupid. Also: Occam’s razor. Basically, the simplest explanations and the cheapest inputs, are usually best.

These are three statements of a similar principle. I learned the first from a chemical engineer. The others are more general. They are nice tests of an idea: how cheap and easy is it? How could it be cheaper and easier? This can lead to cutting corners, but it doesn’t have to.

Those rules are directly applicable to the solutions being offered for the BP blowout, but there are other rules that have more general application.

Rule #3: Carbon dioxide and water are products, not reactants. The system hydrocarbon plus oxygen has more energy (enthalpy) in it than water plus carbon dioxide. This is mostly a consequence of thermodynamics’ First Law. If you get energy out of a system, as in an automobile engine, you can’t get much more energy out of the products. So all the schemes to run your car on water are bosh. No, you can’t use a catalyst to turn it around; catalysts only speed up reactions that are allowed thermodynamically. You have to add energy to do anything chemically with carbon dioxide and water.

Rule #4: Stuff mixes. I’ve recently been engaged in a discussion with a person who has convinced himself that the science on the CFC ban was wrong. His reasoning is that you can pour out gaseous CFCs in a stream because they are heavier than air; therefore they must fall out of the atmosphere and never reach the ozone layer. The Second Law says that things tend toward maximum disorder, which means they mix. Once mixed, stuff doesn’t unmix. Have you ever seen the sugar jump out of a cup of tea and form one of those nice little cubes? Gases mix even more easily.

Rule #5: Everything takes more energy than you think. I’ve seen, far too many times, the lament that our current electrical generating plants “waste” one-third of the energy in their fuels. Welcome to the Carnot cycle! It’s one of the first things thermodynamics students calculate, a sequence of energy generation and use. And the result that those students get, largely a consequence of the Second Law, is that about a third of the input energy goes to entropy, not usable. There are other cycles and other ways to use energy that are more efficient, but if you’ve got a Carnot cycle, the most common cycle for power plants, you’re stuck with that one-third entropy. The Second Law says that there’s always going to be some left-over, not-usable energy, and that there will be even more when you try to reverse a process, like turning carbon dioxide into something else.

There are more. Maybe the ongoing nature of the BP blowout, leading to repeated rebuffs of all those suggestions that aren’t likely to work, will teach some of the public that such rules of thumb exist and are useful.

Original article:
http://peakoil.com/generalideas/arrogance-and-scientific-rules-of-thumb/

EVs Unlikely to Corral Widening Transmission Technology Slate

By James M. Amend
WardsAuto.com, Jun 16, 2010 8:00 AM

With all the hype over electric vehicles, who could blame a transmissions engineer for being concerned about the future?

But industry insiders argue otherwise, saying there’s no better time to be in the gearbox business.

“Yeah, unfortunately for the transmission guys, the transmission will be significantly different, significantly simpler,” admits Jochem Wolschendorf, vice president and chief technology officer at engineering services specialist FEV Inc.

Pure EVs could rely on 1- or 2-speed gearboxes, or more likely do away with the transmission altogether.

But at the same time, Wolschendorf tells the CTI Transmission Symposium North America in Ann Arbor, MI, last week, the foreseeable future holds “tremendous opportunity” given the variety of gearboxes under development.

“There is more parallel development going on than ever before,” adds Craig Renneker, who oversees work on new transmissions at Ford Motor Co. “My advice is to keep an open mind, because it is not clear which (transmission) technology will dominate.”

Also bear in mind electrified vehicles remain in their infancy, notes Justin Ward, program manager-advanced powertrain at Toyota Motor Corp.

“We’re just past the blip stage,” he says.

President Obama wants 1 million pure EVs on U.S. roads by 2015, but that would account for just 1.3% of the vehicles sold in the next five model years, according to Ward’s data. Even more mainstream hybrid-electric vehicles account for less than 2% of all U.S. sales today.

“The growth of (EVs) will take time,” says Ernie DeVincent, vice president-North America engineering at Getrag Transmission Corp. “We’re quite comfortable with the medium-term future.”

Industry experts here see continued expansion in automatic transmission technology globally to where 8-speed units become the norm. Growth also continues in automated manual transmission applications, and further refinement of continuously variable transmissions lies ahead, they say.

But dual-clutch transmissions arguably show the most promise. They match up well with a global push to downsized engines and make the perfect partner for most hybrid systems, experts say.

Identified by the Chinese government as the favored transmission going forward and quite popular in Europe, DeVincent expects the U.S. will be home to the greatest penetration of DCTs within 20 years.

Unlike its peers, however, the DCT requires much work to properly integrate transmission and engine controls, DeVincent warns.

“If you don’t get that right, you will have trouble with idle and launch,” says DeVincent, who sees control systems integration becoming a key element of a transmission engineers’ skills.

Europeans have gravitated to the DCT with no hesitation, the experts note, but their transition was from manual transmissions. In the U.S., drivers have become accustomed to automatics, with torque converters providing a smooth launch.

As such, the potential herky-jerky performance of DCTs will scare off some auto makers, says William Kelley, vice president at dual-clutch expert BorgWarner Inc.

“The level of detail OEMs look for is surprising,” he says.

Ford launches one of the first DCTs in the U.S. with the Fiesta B-car, now arriving at dealers. The electrically operated 6-speed PowerShift DCT uses a dry clutch and mates to a 1.6L 4-cyl. engine. Early reviews of the combination have been uneven.

Renneker admits Ford may need an extra gear in the Fiesta DCT.

“But once we get past that first half-second, it is fantastic,” he says of the combination, which offers 30-40 mpg (7.8-5.9 L/100 km) city/highway.

“We’re watching it very carefully with the launch of the Fiesta,” Renneker adds. “In North America, customers are used to the feel of a torque convertor. It may take a bit of getting used to.”

Globally, it appears the traditional clutch-pedal manual transmission’s days may be numbered.

Phil Gott, director-automotive consulting for IHS Global Insight, tells the conference emerging markets with densely populated urban areas could spell its demise. In China, for example, he expects the self-shifting transmission soon in 50% of new vehicles sold.

“(For the) same reason it became popular in the U.S. – comfort in city driving and more female drivers who don’t want to shift,” he says.

Dave Roberts, senior consultant-automotive and transportation at Frost & Sullivan Ltd., agrees. He says growing wealth in emerging markets will accompany the move from rural to urban living.

“That shift is coming fairly rapidly and will be a major change for the future because it will involve different vehicle preferences,” he says. “Wealthier consumers want more affordable comfort and fuel efficiency.”

Roberts also expects the prices transmission suppliers charge OEMs to rise, as demand for comfort and fuel efficiency increases. By 2015, he expects suppliers will get up to $1,800 for a DCT, an estimated $1,600 for a CVT and up to $1,800 for a traditional stepped-gear automatic.

“By 2025-2030, the technology changes will be tremendous and affect the demand for transmissions,” Roberts says.

That’s good news to the ears of suppliers such as BorgWarner.

“We like that environment, because everyone has to buy different stuff,” Kelley says.

jamend@wardsauto.com

Original article:
http://wardsauto.com/ar/evs_transmission_technology_100616/